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COMMENTS
WHEN DOES A FRANCHISOR BECOME A FIDUCIARY?: CRIM TRUCK
& TRACTOR Co. v. NAVlSTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION
For fourty-two years franchisee Crim Truck & Tractor
("Crim") distributed the products of franchisor Navistar.' When
Crim decided not to implement a new dealer network proposed by
Navistar, Navistar terminated the franchise. Crim sued, alleging
among other claims breach of fiduciary duty.2 The Texas Supreme
Court refused to impose a fiduciary duty on Navistar, finding that
the franchisee had not provided sufficient evidence that a confiden-
tial relationship giving rise to a fiduciary duty existed between it
and the franchisor.
In a franchising relationship, the franchisor grants the franchi-
see a license to operate an independent business according to the
franchisor's direction.3 Most courts have deemed franchising to be
a business relationship, governed by contract, and as such have
refused to impose per se fiduciary obligations on the franchisor.4
However, many jurisdictions recognize that fiduciary obligations
may arise in business relationships due to the nature of the interac-
t. Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 593
(rex. 1992) [hereinafter Crim]. For a full description of the facts see infra section I.A.
2. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
3. ROBERT JUSTIS & RICHARD JUDD, FRANCHISING, 6 (1989).
4. See infra notes 61-89 and accompanying text.
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tion between the parties. If the parties provide sufficient evidence,
courts are willing to find that a confidential relationship exists as a
matter of fact and will therefore impose a fiduciary duty as a mat-
ter of law.5 Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l. Transp.
Corp. marks the intersection between the law of franchising and
the law of confidential relationships. Like most jurisdictions, Texas
jurisprudence allows a court to impose heightened duties in a con-
tractual relationship where the evidence is persuasive that the inter-
action between the parties has induced a higher level of trust and
confidence than that characterizing an arms-length contractual trans-
action.6 In Crim, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the
franchisee's argument that it was owed any heightened duty. While
there is no bright line test under Texas law for determining wheth-
er the plaintiff's evidentiary burden has been met, the facts of
Crim Truck & Tractor were open to the interpretation that a confi-
dential relationship existed, such that the court could have imposed
fiduciary duties on the franchisor.
This Comment reviews the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Crim Truck & Tractor. First, fiduciary obligations are examined
both generally and in the context of franchising. In addition, the
nature of fiduciary obligations in formal and informal relationships
is defined. Further, the factors courts consider to determine whether
to impose heightened duties in a commercial, contract-based rela-
tionship are reviewed.
Second, case law regarding the imposition of heightened duties
in franchisor-franchisee relationships and the circumstances under
which courts have been willing to find a fiduciary duty are dis-
cussed. Finally, the decision reached by the Texas Supreme Court
in Crim Truck & Tractor is reviewed. Specifically, the majority
held that no confidential relationship existed, and thus the franchi-
sor owed no fiduciary duty to the franchisee. The dissent vehe-
mently disagreed.
The majority of state and federal courts have held that the
franchise agreement alone does not create a fiduciary obligation on
the part of the franchisor. The holding of the Texas Supreme Court
in Crim Truck & Tractor conforms with this national precedent in
rejecting the existence of a per se fiduciary duty in the context of
a franchise relationship. However, this Comment argues the court's
5. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
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decision was incorrect on the facts of the case. The outcome is the
result of the court's incorrect application of Texas law regarding
confidential relationships to the facts of Crim Truck & Tractor.
Had the Court correctly applied Texas law, it would have held that
the facts supported the existence of confidential relationship, there-
by supporting the imposition of a fiduciary duty.
I. HISTORY
A. Fiduciary Obligations
The concept of a fiduciary is difficult to define with precision,
and no one definition is sufficiently flexible to cover all relation-
ships.7 Fiduciary obligations may arise in either formal or informal
relationships. In a formal fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary owes
heightened duties to another as a consequence of his or her status
or role. In an informal fiduciary relationship, the court may deter-
mine that the circumstances surrounding the interaction between the
parties support the imposition of a heightened duty.
1. Formal Relationships
The term "fiduciary" derives from Roman law.' As the high-
est duty imposed by law, a fiduciary owes a duty to act with good
faith, trust and confidence towards another.9 Formal fiduciary rela-
tionships include those of trustee and beneficiary, agent and princi-
pal, guardian and ward, and attorney and client."0 Corporate offi-
cers and directors as well as receivers, executors, and administra-
tors are also fiduciaries." In each of these relationships, the fidu-
7. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 593 n.3.
8. BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
9. id
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959); RESTATEMENT OF' RES-
TITUTION § 190 cmt. a (1937).
11. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 190 cmt. a (1937). See generally FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEI., THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
90-108 (1991) (discussion of fiduciary obligations of corporate directors and officers).
Courts have analyzed the relationship of director and corporation by analogizing either to
trusts or to agency. DePinto v. Landge, 411 F.2d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1969). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14F cnts. a-c (1958) (distinguishing fiduciaries
appointed by the court to manage the affairs of others from the fiduciary status of an
agent which derives from the principal-agent relationship). Fiduciary status may also be
legislatively mandated. For example, the conduct of those administering employee benefit
plans is regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1104 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (establishing fiduciary's obligations and standard of
care).
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ciary duty arises from the individual's status as trustee, agent, or
guardian. Thus the entire class of individuals having the status of
trustee, etc. owes a fiduciary duty to the class of individuals hav-
ing the status of beneficiaries, etc. The fiduciary must act for the
benefit of the other party in matters within the scope of the rela-
tionship. 2 This includes subordinating his or her own interest to
that of the other party.13 Failure to do so is a breach of the
fiduciary's duty. However, "[t]he scope of the transactions affected
by the relation and the extent of the duties imposed are not identi-
cal in all fiduciary relations."' 4
2. Informal Relationships
Even absent a formal fiduciary relationship, i.e., in cases
where the parties lack the requisite status, the court may never-
theless impose additional duties on the parties where the relation-
ship involves a high level of trust and confidence between the
parties. 15 Such informal relationships, including those governed by
contract, may be designated as "confidential" relationships. 6 The
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958).
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). A trustee owes a duty of loyalty
"to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170(l) (1959) (emphasis added). Comment a adds that the principle is
applicable not only to trustees but to other fiduciaries. ERISA utilizes similar language:
the fiduciary must "discharge his duty . . . solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2(b).
15. See, e.g., Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 512-513
(Tex. 1942). The Restatement (Second) of Torts also recognizes that "liability [for breach
of a fiduciary duty] is not dependent solely upon an agreement or contractual relation be-
tween the fiduciary and the beneficiary but results from the relation." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1974).
16. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992). A second type of infor-
mal fiduciary relationship is the "special" relationship. Unlike formal fiduciary relationships
and confidential relationship, no fiduciary obligation attaches. Special relationships impose
only a duty a good faith and fair dealing on the parties. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d
521, 524 (Tex. 1983) (Spears, I., concurring). As in formal fiduciary relationships, special
relationships exist as a matter of law, so a party's status serves as proof of the relation-
ship. Gregory B. Westfall, Comment, "But I Know It When I See It': A Practical Frame-
work For Analysis and Argument Of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 835, 841 (1992). Once the court recognizes a special relationship, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing is imposed on the class of individuals having that status. Id This
broad effect has meant that only a limited number of relationships have been recognized
as special by the Texas courts. These include insurer/insured, Arnold v. National County
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987); worker's compensation carri-
erlworker, Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988);
and bank/depositor, Plaza Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 767 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. Ct. App.
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definitions of confidential relationships utilized by the courts all
involve the elements of trust and confidence. For example, one
court stated, "[a] confidential relationship 'may be said to exist
whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the in-
tegrity and fidelity of another.'" 17 Courts have also recognized
that the relationship need not be a legal one, such as that giving
rise to a formal fiduciary duty, but may be "moral, social, domes-
tic, or merely personal."18 Thus, the relation:
arises by reason of kinship between the parties, or profes-
sional, business, or social relations that would 'reasonably
lead an ordinarily prudent person in the management of his
business affairs to repose that degree of confidence in the
defendant which largely results in the substitution of the
will of [one party] for that of the [fiduciary] in the materi-
al matters involved in the transaction. 19
Thus, the scope of the term confidential relationship is necessarily
broad, referring to any relation where "influence has been acquired
and abused, [where] confidence has been reposed and betrayed."2
Establishing a confidential relationship can be extremely diffi-
cult. It is an issue of fact whether the party asserting a confidential
relationship has established that the requisite level of trust and
reliance exists between the parties. 1 The two key concepts are
1989). Unequal bargaining power between the parties or a special element of reliance
must be present before the court will hold the relationship is special. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d
at 167. The Texas courts have refused to impose heightened duties on new classes of
relationships such as employerlemployee, McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d
816, 819-20 (Tex. CL App. 1988), and franchisor/franchisee, Crim Truck & Tractor, 823
S.W.2d at 594.
Although confidential and special relationships are conceptually similar, the duties
owed as a consequence of either relationship may be distinguished:
Although a fiduciary duty encompasses at the very minimum a duty of good
faith and fair dealing, the converse is not true. The duty of good faith and fair
dealing merely requires the parties to "deal fairly" with one another and does
not encompass the often more onerous burden that requires a party to place the
interest of the other party before his own, often attributed to a fiduciary duty.
Il
17. Main v. Merrill Lynch, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
18. Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 261 (Tex. 1951); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Eslick, 586 F. Supp. 763, 766 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (applying Ohio law).
19. Sellers v. Sellers, 428 P.2d 230, 236 (Okla. 1967) (citation omitted).
20. Texas Bank and Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Tex. 1980); Sellers,
428 P.2d at 236.
21. MacDonald v. Follett, 180 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. 1944).
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"justifiable trust" and "relationship before."' The plaintiff must
first show he was "justified in trusting the other party as a fiducia-
ry."23 Trust may be justified if prior to and separate from the
transaction in question there existed a "relationship before" which
exhibited trust and confidence.24 Obviously, this test imposes a
heavy and uncertain evidentiary burden on the party asserting the
existence of the relationship, for it is not at all clear precisely what
facts must be plead.
The existence of a confidential relationship may turn on such
factors as the duration of the parties' relationship, 26 their rela-
tive bargaining power,27 and representations made to induce trust
or confidence.' For example, although joint ownership of an oil
lease alone was not enough to establish a fiduciary duty, in
MacDonald v. Follett,2 9 the Texas Supreme Court stated that a
relation of trust and confidence, giving rise to a fiduciary duty,
would be established if it could be proved as alleged that the par-
ties had an ongoing, six year relationship, had negotiated several
leases and royalty arrangements, and had agreed to work together
to protect each other's interests.3°  When the plaintiff in
MacDonald agreed to renew the lease for the benefit of himself
and the defendant, but renewed it only .for his own benefit, he
breached the fiduciary duty owed to the defendant as a result of
the confidential relationship that existed between them.3' Similar-
ly, in Fitz-Gerald v. Hull,32 the court, relying on MacDonald,
22. See Westfall, supra note 15, at 844-45.
23. Id. at 844.
24. Id. at 845.
25. One court has identified seven general factors: prior business dealings; transfer of
confidential information; presence of close, personal friendship; presence of family rela-
tionship; customary guidance by one party; superior knowledge or known reliance; domi-
nation by one party. I at 850 (quoting Dominguez v. Brackey Enter., Inc., 756 S.W.2d
788, 791-92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)).
26. Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. v. Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex.
1966).
27. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962).
28. Fitz-Gerald, 237 S.W.2d at 264; MacDonald, 180 S.W.2d at 337.
29. 180 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1944).
30. Id. at 337.
31. Id. Usually it is the plaintiff asserting the confidential relationship. Here, Follett
brought suit against MacDonald on the theory of a constructive trust to recover royalties
from mineral leases. A directed verdict was entered in favor of Follett, and both Follett
and MacDonald filed writs of error, such that MacDonald is the plaintiff and Follett the
defendant. Id. at 335-36.
32. 237 S.W.2d 256, 264-65 (Tex. 1951).
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found that a fiduciary relationship was established where one party
took title to a jointly owned oil and gas lease in his own name
and sought to appropriate all the profits from the lease to him-
self.33
Likewise, in a suit brought by an administrator/bank for an
accounting and to recover property for the estate, the court held in
Texas Bank and Trust Co. v. Moore3' that the nephew's relation
with his deceased aunt was a fiduciary relationship.35 The exis-
tence of a familial relationship combined with the bestowing of a
benefit, however, were not enough to establish a fiduciary duty.36
Rather, the court stated that where trust is reposed and substantial
benefit obtained, the beneficiary in such a transaction is a fiducia-
ry.37 The court also noted that the profiting fiduciary in a confi-
dential relationship has a burden to show the fairness of the trans-
action. 8 Since testimony established that the aunt had signed
transfers of funds at her nephew's request, was confused, and re-
lied on and trusted the nephew, the nephew had to testify as to the
fairness of the transfers to overcome the presumption that he had
breached the fiduciary duty he owed to his aunt.39 Because the
nephew did not overcome the presumption of unfairness, the
administrator's allegation that the nephew breached his fiduciary
duty prevailed.' °
The Texas courts seem willing to find a confidential relation-
ship where the relation between the parties is similar to that of the
traditional trustee-beneficiary.4' Where the underlying relationship
is similar to an arms-length transaction, the Texas courts conversely
appear unwilling to find the existence of a confidential relation-
ship.42 For example, in Thigpen v. Locke,43 the court ruled that
'33. 1, at 264. The court noted that the facts supported the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, but since petitioners had not pled this issue, the court was able to find the
existence of only a joint venture. Id
34. 595 S.W.2d 502 Crex. 1980).
35. Id at 507.
36. Id at 508.
37. Id at 508-09.
38. Id at 509.
39. Id
40. id
41. A trust is defined as a relationship of fiduciary nature with a designated property
as its subject matter. The trustee manages the property for the beneficiaries; i.e., the trust-
e has a fiduciary obligation not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary and to put
the beneficiaries' interest ahead of his own. See, e.g., 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & W11LIAM F.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 2.4-2.5 (4th ed. 1987). See also PAUL G. HASKELL,
PREFACE To Tim LAW OF TRUSTS 13 (1975).
42. See Westfall, supra note 15, at 851 (noting unwillingness to find confidential rela-
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no fiduciary duty was established where, over a four year period, a
bank officer had assisted plaintiffs in obtaining loans, supervised
their business, kept the books, and served as a personal friend as
well as business advisor." Without reading the instruments, the
plaintiffs signed over property to the bank officer in what they
believed was a lease. In a suit to set aside the deeds, the plaintiffs
argued that the bank officer had breached his fiduciary duty to
them by not fully revealing what they were signing. 45 The court
held there was no confidential relationship, and that the plaintiffs
were not relieved of their duty to read the instruments. The court
noted that:
mere subjective trust alone is not enough to transform
arms-length dealing into a fiduciary relationship ....
Businessmen generally do trust one another, and their deal-
ings are frequently characterized by cordiality of the kind
testified to here.46
The court again in Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. v.
Thompson47 found only that the defendant had breached a contract
to convey an oil and gas lease, and had not breached any fiduciary
duty.48 Although the plaintiff testified he had trusted the president
of the defendant corporation and relied on his representation that
he would assign royalties to the plaintiff, the court found that the
existence of a confidential relationship had not been established.49
The fiduciary relationship had to arise "before, and apart from" the
contract that formed the basis of the suit.5" Evidence that "one
businessman trusts another, and relies upon his promise to carry
out a contract" was insufficient to show that one businessman
owed the other a fiduciary duty.51
Additionally, the Consolidated Gas court recognized, as had the
Thigpen court, that a fiduciary relationship might arise when the
tionship only on evidence of prior business dealings).
43. 363 S.W.2d 247 (Trex. 1963).
44. Id at 253.
45. Id at 251-52.
46. Id at 253. The court limited its holding to the facts because the Lockes' testimony
relied solely on their subjective feelings of trust. Id
47. 405 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1966).
48. Id at 336-37.
49. Id at 337.
50. Id at 336.
51. Id
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parties had worked together over a long period of time towards a
common goal. 2 Subsequently, courts have interpreted this state-
ment to mean that in order to establish the fiduciary relationship,
"the dealings between the parties [must] have continued for such a
period of time that one party is justified in relying on the other to
act in his best interest."53 Courts have ruled that relationships
continuing for only a few months or a year or two are of insuffi-
cient duration. 4
Thus, it appears that although Texas courts are willing to im-
pose fiduciary duties on the parties to a confidential relationship, it.
is not easy to establish the requisite level of trust and confidence
where the underlying transaction is an arms-length contract. . The
parties must have worked toward a common goal for a sufficient
period of time to establish that the trust and confidence reposed by
one party in the other were justified. Mere subjective trust is insuf-
ficient. Recognition of confidential relationships, however, appears
to be limited to those relationships bearing some resemblance to
the trustee-beneficiary relation. Texas courts seem reluctant to
recognize confidential relationships in cases characterized by a
commercial contract.
B. What Duty Does A Franchisor Owe?
A court can approach the franchisor-franchisee relationship
from several perspectives. The simplest is to consider franchising a
straight-forward commercial arrangement between businesspeople,
and therefore apply contract principles to any disputes that arise
between the parties. The parties would then owe each other only
those duties that have been contractually specified. A more com-
plex perspective acknowledges the commercial nature of the rela-
tionship, but looks additionally at the balance of power that directs
the interaction between the parties. This latter approach permits the
application of tort-based breach of duty principles to franchising
disputes. In either case, the nature of the franchisor-franchisee
relationship must be understood before any decision can be reached
52. Id at 337.
53. O'Shea v. Coronado Transmission Co., 656 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
54. See, e.g., O'Shea, 656 S.W.2d at 559 (2 years); Gonzalez v. City of Mission, 620
S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. CL App. 1981) (1 year); Thomson v. Norton, 604 S.W.2d 473,
474 (Tex. CL App. 1980) (few months).
55. Consolidated Bearing and Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 720 S.W.2d 647, 649
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (courts are strict, "emphasizing the distinction between factual proof
of a confidential relationship and mere subjective assertions by one party.").
115919931
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as to the standard of care governing the parties' actions.
1. The Nature of the Franchise Relationship
A franchise relationship is a mutually beneficial business ar-
rangement between the franchisor and the franchisee; a "form of
commercial venture [in which] both parties have a common interest
and profit from the activities of the other."56 The franchisor grants
the franchisee the right to do business in a prescribed manner, for
which the franchisee pays an initial fee and ongoing licensing and
royalty fees.57 The relationship is governed by a detailed contract
that often specifies everything from the color of the employees'
uniforms to the amount of ketchup put on a hamburger.58  The
franchisor often responds to contract breaches by termination or
non-renewal of the franchise. The franchisee frequently alleges
wrongful termination, and litigation ensues.59 Although the grava-
men of the franchisee's complaint is wrongful termination, the
cause of action may sound in either contract or tort. Because con-
tract remedies are potentially less satisfactory than tort remedies,
the franchisee may claim it was owed a fiduciary duty by the
franchisor.6° The court's response to these pleadings will vary
56. Amott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 446
U.S. 918 (1980). A marriage metaphor is also used to describe the relationship. See An-
thony G. Covatta, Aspects of Systemwide Discontent: Learning to Live Together, Avoiding
Divorce, 12 FRANCHISE L. J. 33, 55 (1992).
57. See JUSTIS & JUDD, supra note 2, at 6. See also GLADYS GLICKMAN, FRANCHIS-
ING, § 2.02[2] at 2-11 (1992).
58. Judith M. Bailey, A Form Unit Franchise Agreement, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J 585,
593; Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1990) (discussing relation of length between con-
tract and length of franchise arrangement). But see Arnort, 609 F.2d at 881 and n.6 (de-
fining the nature of a franchise relationship as something beyond an arms-length contractu-
al arrangement).
59. Hadfield, supra note 57, at 970; Covatta, supra note 51, at 33.
60. The franchisee may also claim it was owed the duty of good faith and fair dealing
by the franchisor. The duty arises either from the franchise contract or because of the
special relationship between the franchisor and franchisee. Jurisdictions that recognize a
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing have been willing to allow a cause of
action for a franchisoer's breach of such duty. See Devery Implement Co. v. J.I. Case Co.,
[1990-92 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 9889 at 22,577 (10th Cir.
1991); Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 47-48 (8th Cir. 1982); Dunfee v.
Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Mont. 1986). Arbitrary termination of the
franchise by the franchisor is recognized as a breach of the franchisor's implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing that is "inherent in every business relationship." Bain, 692
F.2d at 48. Additionally, some courts impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing where
the plaintiff can demonstrate the relationship between the franchisor and franchisee is
special. Amos v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 663 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (D.Or. 1987) (ftan-
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based on the facts of the particular case and its perspective of the
franchise relationship.
2. Fiduciary Duty
Some commentators have argued that franchise relationships
should involve fiduciary duties.6" One commentator observes that
over time courts have determined that fiduciary duties arise in
complex transactions of long duration, where the relationship is
characterized by disparity of power and opportunities for abuse,
especially through "clandestine self-preference."62 Franchise rela-
tionships fit this established pattern because they are characterized
by the franchisor's "pervasive power of control."63
Following this reasoning, the court in Arnott v. American
Ol1 argued along similar lines to reach the proposition that
"[i]nherent in a franchise relationship is a fiduciary duty."65 In
Arnott, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court had not
erred in instructing that a fiduciary relationship existed between the
franchisor/oil company and franchisee/service station as a matter of
law.' The court based its holding on an examination of franchise
relationships, franchise jurisprudence, and the facts of the case,
finding that the franchisor breached its "'fiduciary' duty of good
faith and fair dealing" when it terminated the franchise lease with-
out good cause.6
7
Other commentators 6 and the majority of jurisdictions have
chisee must show special relationship existed). But see Little Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 852 F.2d 441, 446 (9th Cir. 1988) (as matter of law, special relationship
does not exist between franchisor and franchisee).
61. Harold Brown, Franchising - A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. REv. 650
(1971). But cf. Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 355 n.6 (7th Cir. 1982)
(court notes that Brown does not cite a firm precedential basis for finding fiduciary duty,
but merely "argues for a desirable prospective judicial policy") with Mister Donut of
America, Inc. v. Harris, 723 P.2d 670, 673 (Ariz. 1986) (citing Brown with approval and
holding franchisor-franchisee relationship "special" as a matter of law).
62. Brown, supra note 60, at 665. Brown implies the franchisor will act in his own
self interest, and conceal this from the franchisee. However, it is equally possible the
franchisee will be the one to act with "clandestine self-preference." See Anne L. Austin &
Frank L. Winfrey, Reciprocal Agency in Franchise Channels of Distribution, 4 Soc'Y OF
FRANCIHISIG PROC. 8 (1990).
63. Brown, supra note 60, at 664.
64. 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
65. Id at 881.
66. let at 884.
67. Id.
68. Brown, supra note 60, appears to be the only commentator who has advocated that
franchisors owe a per se fiduciary duty to their franchisees. At the other end of the spec-
11611993]
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rejected the automatic imposition of per se fiduciary duty in a
franchise relationship.69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that when a manufacturer is free to make pricing and distribution
decisions for its own benefit, as a franchisor does, the franchisor-
franchisee relation is "not that of a fiduciary to a beneficiary;" the
franchisor is far from being a "traditional trustee." 70 Subsequent to
Arnott, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the case on its facts:
What [Arnott] actually decided... was simply that [the
franchisor's] arbitrary termination of [the franchisee's]
lease constituted a breach of [the franchisor's] implied duty
of "good faith and fair dealing." Inasmuch as the duty of
"good faith and fair dealing" is inherent in every business
relationship, it was unnecessary to the decision to label that
duty as "fiduciary." In any event, Arnott does not stand for
the proposition that the grant of a franchise of itself in all
instances imposes on the franchisor all of the duties and
responsibilities which traditionally pertain to a true fiducia-
ry 7
1
trum, some argue that no additional duties beyond those contractually specified should be
imposed on franchisors. See, e.g., Lee A. Rau, Implied Obligations in Franchising: Be-
yond Terminations, 47 BUs. LAW. 1053 (1992).
69. Carter Equip. Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip., 681 F.2d 386, 390 n.6 (5th Cir.
1982) (declining to adopt Arnott because existence of fiduciary relationship is question of
fact). See also O'Neal v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 860 F.2d 1341, 1349 (6th Cir. 1988)
("franchise agreements do not give rise to fiduciary or confidential relationships"); Jack
Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 711 (7th Cir. 1984) (Wiscon-
sin common law does not make franchisor fiduciary of his franchisees); Murphy v. White
Hen Pantry, 691 F.2d 350, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that courts refuse to impose
general fiduciary duty); Layton v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D.
Md. 1989) (franchisor/franchisee relationship not fiduciary or confidential in nature); Gen-
eral Bus. Machines v. Nat'l Semiconductor Datachecker, 664 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (D.
Utah 1987) (existence of fiduciary relationship is question for jury); Power Motive Corp.
v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.C. Colo. 1985) (under Ohio
law, franchise relationship does not give rise to fiduciary duties); RIM Sales & Marketing
v. Banfi Products Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1377-78 (D. Minn. 1982) (franchise relation-
ship not automatically fiduciary); Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers
Int'l., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1047, 1053 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (license without more does not
create fiduciary relationship).
70. Boat & Motor Mart v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 825 F.2d 1285, 1292 (9th Cir. 1987).
71. Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in
original). See also Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167,
171 (8th Cir. 1987) (following Bain in rejecting Arnott because a "franchise or other
ordinary business relationship does not alone create fiduciary duties"); Domed Stadium
Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984) (following Bain's ar-
gument that the Arnott court only applied basic contract principles).
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Nonetheless, even jurisdictions that reject a per se fiduciary
duty recognize that a fiduciary duty may arise independent of the
contractual arrangement because of the nature of the relationship
between the parties.72 In Carter Equipment Co. v. John Deere
Indus. Equip., 3 the court suggests that in determining the exis-
tence of a fiduciary duty in a contractually-based relationship the
fact finder should look to the parties' mutual or shared purposes,
the requisite need for trust and confidence, and the relative power,
authority and bargaining positions of the parties.7'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals7" applied these factors in
two subsequent cases: Walker v. U-Haul Co. of Miss. 6 and Phil-
lips v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. .77 The Walker court found that the
plaintiff had sufficient evidence to submit his fiduciary duty claim
to a jury.78 The plaintiff argued that his business relationship with
the defendant was of 14 years duration,79 and their contract con-
tained language stating the relationship must be "mutually benefi-
cial" and was one of "trust."80 The court further noted that the
franchisor's power over the franchisee was "obvious and undisput-
ed." a' Based on this evidence, the Walker court determined that
the district court had erred in granting summary judgment for the
defendant on the issue of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, in
Phillips, the evidence did not support a finding that the franchisor
breached a fiduciary duty owed to its franchisee.82 The franchisee
was unable to present any evidence that promises made by the
72. Carter Equip., 681 F.2d at 390 (error was not in finding cause of action but in
improperly instructing jury as to what constituted breach of fiduciary duty). See also
Walker v. U-Haul Co. of Miss., 734 F.2d 1068, 1075 (5th Cir. 1984) (existence of fidu-
ciary relationship depends on facts); Eaton, Yale and Towne, Inc. v. Sherman Indus.
Equip. Co., 316 F. Supp. 435, 445 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (record showed no special circum-
stance to impose fiduciary duty where none normally exists).
73. 681 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1982).
74. Carter Equip., 681 F.2d at 391. Utah law holds that the relationship is created
where the trusting party is induced to relax his ordinary care and vigilance. The evidence
must necessarily show "the placement of trust and reliance." General Bus. Machines, 664
F. Supp. at 1425.
75. The Tenth Circuit has also utilized the Carter Equip. analysis. Devery Implement
Co. v. J.L Case Co., [1990-92 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 9889 at
22,579 (10th Cir. 1991).
76. 734 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1984).
77. 792 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1986).
78. Walker, 734 F.2d at 1076.
79. Id
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Phillips, 792 F.2d at 525.
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franchisor's agent were intended to deceive him. 3 Because the
Carter test requires at a minimum proof of bad faith, absent fraud
or bad faith it follows that there was no breach of fiduciary du-
ty.s4 It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit's test resolves
the issue on factual grounds - the fiduciary obligation does not
arise per se, but-will only arise under certain factual circumstances.
Courts also look to the jurisdiction's statutory scheme to deter-
mine whether a fiduciary relationship has evolved out of the fran-
chise arrangement.8 5 The Arnott court based its holding in part on
South Dakota's comprehensive franchise legislation, as well as -the
"surge" of general franchise legislation, finding such legislation to
be indicative of the fiduciary nature of the relationship.86 Con-
versely, after analyzing Virginia's franchising statute, one court
stated that since the statute required franchisors to deal fairly there
was no need to elevate this to a fiduciary duty and create an addi-
tional cause of action for its breach. 7
Other than in instances where the facts reveal abuse by the
franchisor in terminating the franchise, the prevailing approach to
franchisor-franchisee relations appears to be that stated in Picture
Lake Campground Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.88 : "the franchise rela-
tionship is inherently a business relationship, not a fiduciary re-
lationship." 89
83. Id. at 526.
84. Id
85. Brown's commentary is based partly on an absence of statutory protection at the
time. Brown, supra note 60, at 651. The policy goal of statutes such as the Automobile
Dealers Day in Court Act was to equalize the power of franchisor and franchisee. See
Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 369 U.S.
887 (1962). Prospective franchising legislation in Iowa has a similar goal. See Covatta,
supra note 55, at 60-61.
86. Amott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 1979). The dissent argues
the statute merely enjoined unfair or inequitable practices. Id at 890 (Bright, 3., concur-
ring and dissenting). The Bain court also rejected Arnott on the grounds that Missouri's
statute was not comparably comprehensive, and contained no language to indicate the
franchise relationship should be considered a fiduciary one. Bain v. Champlin Petroleum
Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982).
87. Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D.
Va. 1980).
88. 497 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1980).
89. Id See also Rosenberg v. Pillsbury Co., 718 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(franchisor-franchisee relationship is "an arms-length, commercial one, with the parties' re-
lations governed by the terms of the offering circular and franchise agreement"); Bonfield
v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 867, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("business relation-
ships do not of themselves create fiduciary obligations"); Weight Watchers of Quebec Ltd.
v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1047, 1053 (parties' rights and duties deter-
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II. CRIM TRUCK & TRACTOR Co. v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION CoRPoRATION
From the preceding review, it may be seen that most courts
characterize the franchisor-franchisee relation as a business relation-
ship, not as a fiduciary relationship. To prove the franchisor owes
a duty beyond that specified by the contract, the franchisee must
establish the existence of a confidential relationship. Absent such 4
relationship, the franchisor does not owe a fiduciary duty to the
franchisee. This section examines how one court reviewed the facts
of a relationship to deny that any heightened duty was owed to the
franchisee.
A. Background
The facts of Crim Truck & Tractor reflect a common problem
faced by franchisors who wish to alter their dealership arrange-
ments to meet competitive market situations.9° Since 1943, 9'
Crim Truck & Tractor had acted as a distributor of Navistar's
products.' Under its most recent distribution agreement,93
Navistar could terminate a dealer only if the dealer had breached
any of eleven contractual provisions.' As a competitive measure,
mined by their underlying contract).
90. The situation was particularly acute for Navistar, given its brush with bankruptcy
and its continuing problems with reestablishing itself. See generally Chet Borucki and
Carole K. Barnett, Restructuring for Survival - The Navistar Case, 4 THE ExEcUTIvE 36
(1990) (exploring the Navistar case and raising implications for the effective management
of organizational decline and renewal). See also Groseth Int'l Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410
N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1987) (wrongful termination case arising from the purchase of division
by J.I.Case/Tenneco from International Harvester/Navistar and resulting reformation of
dealer network).
91. The relationship was formalized in 1958. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d 591,
593 (Tex. 1992).
92. The relationship began with International Harvester, Navistar's predecessor. I&
93. The agreement was dated 1979. IM
94. It Additionally, the dealer had a reasonable opportunity to cure any claimed
breach. The specific nature of the provisions is not stated. The dissent specifies certain
features of the contract that illustrate the imbalance of power such as: Navistar could
change truck models without liability; Navistar had unilateral control over what orders it
would accept from dealers; dealers could cancel orders only in limited circumstances; after
an order is placed, Navistar could retroactively modify price and terms; dealers had to
pay all shipping and handling; dealers paid advertising costs and advertising content and
quality was controlled by Navistar, Navistar could compete directly with its dealers; deal-
ers could not relocate without approval; dealers had to provide a service center and had
to service all products; and dealers had to hire and train all personnel. Id at 599-600
(Mauzy, J., dissenting). However, such provisions are common in franchise agreements.
See generally Bailey, supra note 57 (setting forth form franchise agreement).
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Navistar developed a nationwide communications network designed
to facilitate communication between Navistar and its dealers so that
customers could be provided better warranty and repair services.95
Crim Truck & Tractor did not send a representative to the meeting
called by Navistar to introduce the network to all of its dealers.96
The dealers were asked to purchase the computer equipment neces-
sary to implement the network.97
Although Navistar considered participation in the network man-
datory,98 Crim Truck & Tractor elected not to sign the sales and
service agreement regarding the equipment purchase.9" When Crim
Truck & Tractor did not comply with repeated requests to sign and
return the sales and service agreement, Navistar terminated the
franchise in April of 1985. 00 Crim Truck & Tractor brought suit
against Navistar for breach of fiduciary duty. 1' Crimargued that
the evidence supported the conclusion that a confidential relation-
ship existed."
B. The Majority Opinion
At issue before the Texas Supreme Court was whether there
was evidence of a confidential relationship giving rise to a fidu-
ciary duty between the parties to a franchise agreement.'03 Plain-
95. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 593.
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id At trial, a Navistar representative testified that the computer system was
functional in only half the dealerships; the rest were still using the old written forms and
had not been terminated. Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l, 791 S.W.2d 241,
244 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), aftd, 823 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1992).
99. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 593.
100. Id
101. Crim Truck & Tractor, 791 S.W.2d at 242. Crim also sued for breach of contract
and conspiracy to convert assets. The jury found in favor of Crim Truck & Tractor on all
three questions and fixed actual damages of $1.6 million and exemplary damages of $1.75
million. Navistar appealed, and the appellate court reversed on the tort claims and re-
manded the contract claims. Id at 242, 245.
102. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 594.
103. Id at 592. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to
reverse the tort judgment and remand the contract claim. Id at 592-93. In addition, the
Texas Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument to impose "a common law fiduciary
duty on franchisors in the termination of franchise agreements." Id at 596. The amici
curiae argued the franchisor/franchisee relationship should be deemed a special relationship,
an argument the Supreme Court also rejected because it felt the level of control exerted
by the franchisor over the franchisee did not reach that of the insurer over the insured.
Furthermore, the franchisee was protected from abuse by statute. Id at 596 n.8. The dis-
sent disagreed with these rulings as well. Id at 601-02 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
CRIM TRUCK & TRACTOR V NAVISTAR
tiff Crim Truck & Tractor relied on two circumstances to support
its allegation cf a confidential relationship. First, Crim testified that
he believed the relationship with Navistar was one of mutual trust
and confidence. 4 Second, as further evidence of a confidential
relationship, Crim pointed to a "General Provisions" section of the
contract containing language that stated the contract involved "mu-
tual confidence and trust" and was thus unassignable.0 5
The court rejected Crim's testimony as insufficient to create a
confidential relationship. 6 Relying on Thigpen v. Locke" and
Consolidated Gas v. Thompson,1°8 where the courts held no con-
fidential relationships arose in business relationships despite their
duration and trust and reliance, the Crim Truck & Tractor court
held that a long, cordial relationship is not evidence of a confiden-
tial relationship."t
In response to Crim's contract language evidence, the court
noted that all contracts include a degree of trust and confidence
that parties will fulfill their contractual obligations."' In rejecting
Crim's reliance on the contract language, the court found that
contract language plaintiff considered evidence of a confidential
relationship to be mere "boilerplate", "designed to give the parties
some degree of control over with whom they do business and
nothing more."".
C. The Dissent
The dissent vehemently disagreed with tfie majority's interpreta-
tion of Texas law and its application to the facts of Crim Truck &
Tractor. In a carefully reasoned argument, the dissent points to
several deficiencies in the majority's opinion.
The dissenting opinion is premised upon the majority's com-
plete failure "to give due recognition to imbalances of power in
business relationships."" 2 The dissent pointed to "the wealth of
evidence" presented by the plaintiff that indicated the relationship
104. Id. at 595.
105. -Id at 595 n.7.
106. Id. at 595-96.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
109. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 595.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 596.
112. Id at 602 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
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was a confidential one."' This wealth of evidence included these
facts: Crim had worked for Navistar for fifteen years with no con-
tract; Crim testified that he relied on a provision in the franchise
agreement specifying that the agreement involved "mutual confi-
dence and trust," and absent such provision, would not have
signed; and Crim had never breached the agreement. The dissent
would have upheld the jury's determination, based on the total
evidence, that a fiduciary relationship existed between Navistar and
crim.
114
Criticizing the majority for failing to give due consideration to
the jury's decision, the dissent accused the majority of selecting
certain facts and "assigning weight to those according to its own
inclination."11 5 The dissent found the majority's reliance on
Thigpen v. Locke"16 for the proposition that a confidential rela-
tionship must be of long duration before it gives rise to a fiduciary
duty to be misplaced, noting that the parties in Thigpen had known
each other for less than four years, whereas Crim had worked with
Navistar for over forty years." 7 Although the dissent agreed with
the majority that a non-assignability clause might not be conclusive
evidence of a confidential relationship, nevertheless, the dissent felt
it was "some evidence of trust and confidence."" 8 Thus, the dis-
sent argued, the majority had explained away some of the
contract's most important language. The dissent was willing to give
credence to the plaintiff's argument - if the contract was not
intended to induce trust and reliance, why include the language and
non-assignability clause as Navistar did? Pointing to numerous
provisions in the franchise agreement, the dissent found "ample"
evidence of Navistar's "overwhelming bargaining power and exclu-
sive control."" 9
The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on the franchising
cases it cited as persuasive authority for rejecting the imposition of
fiduciary duties in a contract-based relationship.' 2' The dissent
noted that in the context of franchise termination, many of those
courts had recognized that a franchise relationship may give rise to
113. Id. at 598.
114. Id. at 599.
115. Id.
116. 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1962).
117. Id at 597.
118. Id at 598.
119. Id at 599. See supra note 93 for a discussion of the contract provisions.
120. Id at 601.
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fiduciary duties as a matter of fact.21 Because the Navistar-Crim
Truck & Tractor relationship was factually similar to those cases,
the dissent found the majority's decision "fundamentally at odds"
with the franchising cases it cited.' 2 The dissent would have uti-
lized such precedent as support for Crim's arguments that a fidu-
ciary relationship had been established. Based on these criticisms
and arguments, the dissent would have upheld the jury's determina-
tion that the Navistar-Crim Truck & Tractor relationship was a
confidential one giving rise to a fiduciary duty.
DI. ANALYsIs
The Texas Supreme Court held that Navistar owed no fiduciary
duty to Crim Truck & Tractor because the franchisee had not
established the existence of a confidential relationship between the
parties. Given the fundamentally commercial nature of the franchise
relationship, it seems logical that the franchisor should not owe a
per se fiduciary duty to the franchisee. The holding of Crim Truck
& Tractor thereby aligns Texas law with other jurisdictions that
have refused a per se imposition of fiduciary obligations. For fran-
chisors attempting to operate a nationwide business, this holding is
welcome. One competitive advantage of franchising is the ability to
reduce costs and meet consumer expectations through standardized
products and service quality levels." Standardization is eroded
when courts in each jurisdiction apply different standards of care to
the franchisors' treatment of the franchisee. Because Texas now
officially follows national precedent, the decision reduces the
franchisors' uncertainty about how they will be treated in that
jurisdiction.
However, under Texas law, the facts of the case are open to
the interpretation that a confidential relationship existed between
Navistar and Crim Truck & Tractor. The existence of a confiden-
tial relationship is a question of fact, and the jury at the trial level
found that the relationship did exist. 4 The Texas Supreme Court
failed to give proper deference to the jury verdict; even on a de
novo review, the Court should have found a confidential relation-
121. Id,
122. Id
123. Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy II, Franchising: Firms, Markets, and
Intangible Assets, 42 So. ECON. J. 572, 584 (1976).
124. Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l, 791 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990), aff'd, 823 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1992).
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ship. Thus, it can be argued that regardless of how welcome the
decision was to franchisors, the Texas Supreme Court's holding
was wrong on the facts of the case.
To establish the existence of a confidential relationship, Texas
law requires facts that demonstrate certain characteristics: a relation
of trust and confidence; a relation of long duration; control by the
dominant party over the affairs of the trusting party; and reliance
by the trusting party that the dominant party's actions are done for
his benefit."n The fact pattern of Crim Truck & Tractor exhibits
these characteristics. Crim testified that he signed the last contract
revision in reliance on its language that the relation was one of
trust and confidence, and that absent such language, he would not
have signed. The parties had a long relationship - forty-three
years overall, and six from the latest contract revision to termina-
tion. Like most franchise agreements, the contract gave Navistar
tremendous control over the management of Crim Truck &
Tractor's business. The franchisee relied on Navistar to act for its
benefit.
Despite these facts, the court rejected the evidence as insuffi-
cient to establish a confidential relationship. To do this, the court
relied heavily on Thigpen v. Locke 26 and Consolidated Gas &
Equipment Co. v. Thompson. 27 The court cites to Thigpen for
the proposition that a commercial relationship is not a confidential
one because a commercial contract always involves trust and confi-
dence; businessmen expect performance, not breach. However, a
close reading of Thigpen shows that the Thigpen court did n6t
reject the existence of a confidential relationship because the con-
tract was between businesspeople; rather the existence of a confi-
dential relationship was rejected because the plaintiff's only evi-
dence of its existence was his own subjective feeling of trust. Such
evidence was simply insufficient to establish the relationship.' 2
Crim relied on far more than a mere feeling of subjective trust to
establish the relationship. As a demonstration of his objective trust,
Crim cited to the contract language he had relied on. The Texas
Supreme Court's reliance on Thigpen to reject Crim's evidence was
inapposite.
Equally flawed was the Crim Truck & Tractor court's reliance
125. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
126. 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1963).
127. 405 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1966). See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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on Consolidated Gas. The court cited Consolidated Gas for the
proposition that a confidential relationship must be of long dura-
tion. The relationship in Consolidated Gas lasted a few years.
Other cases citing Consolidated Gas involve relationships of a few
months or a few years duration." 9 Yet in Crim Truck & Tractor
the parties had worked under the most recent contract revision for
six years, and had done business together for forty-three. By any
standard, the Navistar-Crim Truck & Tractor relationship was one
of long duration, such that Crim was justified in relying on
Navistar. The Texas Supreme Court's reliance on Consolidated Gas
was also misplaced.
Rather than rely on Thigpen and Consolidated Gas, the Texas
Supreme Court could have considered those cases where the evi-
dence was sufficient to establish a confidential relationship. In both
MacDonald v. Follett'" and Fitz-Gerald v. Hull,"' the parties
were joint owners of oil and gas leases, and one party sought to
divert all the royalties to himself."' In these cases, -the parties
worked together for mutual benefit as did Navistar and Crim Truck
& Tractor. Additionally, the trusting party in both cases did so
because the actions of the other party had induced such trust. Crim
Truck & Tractor reposed trust in Navistar because of the actions
Crim testified to. The critical elements of these two cases are suffi-
ciently on point such that the Crim Truck & Tractor court could
have utilized them as authority had it wanted to find a confidential
relationship was established between Navistar and Crim Truck &
Tractor.
The Texas Supreme Court could also have turned to case law
from other jurisdictions finding the existence of a confidential
relationship or imposing fiduciary duties in the context of franchis-
ing. While these cases are only persuasive authority, they would
have provided guidance to the Texas court on how to account for
the nature of a relationship based on a franchise contract. The line
of cases from the Fifth Circuit imposing fiduciary duties are partic-
ularly pertinent." These decisions are based on Mississippi law
regarding confidential relationships which is similar to Texas law.
Mississippi law recognizes that fiduciary relationships are not re-
129. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
130. 180 S.W.2d 334 (rex. 1944).
131. 237 S.W.2d 256 (rex. 1951).
132. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
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stricted to the traditional relationships of trustee and beneficiary,
partners, etc.'34 Where a party occupies a position out of which
fiduciary obligations ought to arise "in equity and good con-
science," the Mississippi courts will impose the duty even if the
relationship is contractual.'
Texas law also recognizes fiduciary obligations as arising in
informal relationships characterized by trust and confidence even if
the relationship is governed by contract. Furthermore, the facts of
the Mississippi cases discussed above are similar to those of Crim
Truck & Tractor. All three cases involve long relationships: twelve
years for Carter and John Deere," fourteen years for Walker and
U-Haul,3 7 and over forty years for Crim Truck & Tractor and
Navistar. 38 Walker relied on the contract language regarding trust
and confidence 139 as did Crim Truck & Tractor. 4' In building
new facilities, Carter relied on Deere's representations that it would
broaden its product line. 4' Similarly, Crim Truck & Tractor had
relied on Navistar's growth to formulate its business strategies. 42
Because of the close similarity in law and facts, the Texas Su-
preme Court could have used these Fifth Circuit cases as a model
to find a confidential relationship in Crim Truck & Tractor.
It seems clear that had the Texas court wished to find a confi-
dential relationship it could have done so with no great legal or
logical difficulty. The Crim Truck & Tractor decision merely re-
flects the court's hesitancy to find a confidential relationship where
the paities' relationship can be more easily be characterized as a
contractual business relationship. Although the decision is favorable
to' franchisors and aligns Texas with national precedent in franchis-
ing law, the decision is an unfortunate one because it further mud-
dies the waters in which confidential relationships are fast sinking.
IV. CONCLUSION
One commentator concluded that "[c]onfidential relationships
134. Carter Equip. v. John Deere Indus. Equip., 681 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1982).
135. Id
136. Id at 388-89.
137. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 1, 16 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
141. Crim Truck & Tractor, 681 F.2d at 388-89.
142. Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l, 791 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990), affd, 823 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1992).
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will be determined to exist upon the facts in each case combined
with supporting or countervailing principles of law, equity, and
public policy.""'3 Crim Truck & Tractor illustrates that the analy-
sis is by no means so simple. The only aspect of confidential
relationships that seems obvious is that the party wishing to estab-
lish one bears a heavy and uncertain evidentiary burden. In rhetori-
cal frustration the dissent exclaimed, "What sort of evidence, then,
might tend to establish a confidential relationship?"' The major-
ity rejected evidence of trust and reliance, evidence of a cordial,
long-enduring relationship, and even express contractual language
that mutual confidence and trust characterized the relationship.14
By rejecting these obvious elements as insufficient, the Texas Su-
preme Court leaves future plaintiffs and fact finders in an awkward
position since they cannot point to any bright-line test that declares
what sort and what amount of evidence will prove the existence of
a confidential relationship. A judicial standard of "I know it when
I see it"" does not make for good law.
While the business nature of a franchise relationship makes it
logical that franchisors should not unilaterally be held to duties
beyond those contractually specified, where the facts demonstrate
that the franchisor has acted to induce trust and confidence, the
imposition of additional duties may be warranted. To find the exis-
tence of a confidential relationship in a contract-based relationship
such as franchising, the courts must balance the appropriate defer-
ence to the parties' freedom to contract with any facts demonstrat-
ing egregious conduct. Only then may the court correctly separate
an ordinary breach of contract from the breach of a more onerous
duty. The facts of Crim Truck & Tractor are persuasive that the
franchisor owed additional duties to its franchisee. Because the
court did not impose any higher duty than that imposed under the
contract, Crim Truck & Tractor is a poor decision. Texas law and
franchising law would have supported a ruling that a confidential
relationship had been established between the franchisor and fran-
chisee. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the franchisor and
the franchisee had developed such a level of trust and confidence
143. See Westfall, supra note 15, at 869.
144. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 597.
145. Id.
146. See Westfall, supra note 11, at title (quoting Justice Stewart's comments concerning
pornography).
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that the imposition of a fiduciary duty would have been justified,
even though under ordinary circumstances the franchise relationship
is a business relationship, governed by contract, and nothing more.
ANNE L. AUSTIN, PH.D.
